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Abstract 
We test the hypothesis that people with depression experience difficulties in 
maintaining task relevant context information over longer periods of time using the 
AX version of the continuous performance task (AX-CPT). The AX-CPT requires 
that participants maintain a context cue in an active state (A) in order to respond 
correctly to a target cue (X) presented after a short delay. Forty non-depressed and 
mild to moderately depressed students completed versions of the task with short (1-s) 
or long (10-s) inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs). Mildly depressed participants made 
significantly more context dependent (BX) errors, unlike controls who made more 
errors on trials where good context processing would impair performance (AY). This 
pattern of errors was only evident in the long ISI condition suggesting poor 
maintenance of contextual information. 
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Performance across many cognitive domains, including working memory and 
executive function, has been linked to an underlying ‘context processing mechanism’ 
(Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). In this framework, the term context refers to any 
background information required to be active to ensure appropriate behaviour (Cohen, 
Barch, Carter, & Servan-Schreiber, 1999). Context processing has also been linked to 
various psychopathologies. For instance, considerable evidence indicates that 
impairments in context processing accompany schizophrenia (e.g., Servan-Schreiber, 
Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). We have also proposed that context processing mediates 
distinct learning impairments in mild depression (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & 
Kornbrot, 2005). In the present study, we test this hypothesis directly by using the AX 
version of the continuous performance task (AX-CPT), a standard procedure designed 
to distinguish context processes from other more general cognitive processes and 
which has previously been shown to discriminate impaired performance in 
schizophrenia (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996).  
Context processing is thought to be involved in experimental tasks when, (i) 
task instructions, (ii) environmental, spatial or temporal cues, or (iii) prior discrete 
stimuli determine responding to subsequent stimuli, particularly when an 
inappropriate response must be inhibited. Many experimental procedures have these 
requirements but two in particular seem to distinguish those with depression from 
controls.  
The Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) both require that 
participants inhibit a prepotent response to follow a rule (i.e., name an ink colour 
incongruent with a colour word; follow a new rule rather than a previously learned 
one). A recent systematic review has shown that there is strong evidence of 
depression related impairments on both the WCST (5/6 studies) and Stroop (6/6 
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studies) tasks (Ottowitz, Dougherty, & Savage, 2002) which suggests the presence of 
context processing difficulties in depression. Evidence from learning studies is 
similarly suggestive. We have previously reported how people with mild depression 
are impervious to changes in context information and, consequently, on some 
occasions seem to learn better than controls (Msetfi et al., 2005). We interpreted this 
finding as a depression related impairment in sensitivity to the information provided 
by the context (See Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007).  Although this body of 
evidence points towards context processing effects in depression, equivocal evidence 
of a depression related impairment has emerged from an experimental procedure 
specifically designed to assess context processes.  
The AX version of the continuous performance task (AX-CPT: Servan-
Schreiber et al., 1996) requires participants to use previously presented stimuli to 
determine whether a response is appropriate or not. They are asked to observe letter 
pairs presented sequentially on a screen at short (1-s) or long intervals (5 to 10-s) and 
to respond affirmatively to a target letter X, only if the letter A appears first. If any 
other letter precedes X or follows A, then a ‘non-target’ response should be made.  
Correct target identification is therefore dependent upon processing the first stimulus 
of the pair, which might be termed the ‘context’ stimulus. This simple task is made 
even more challenging because many more target than non-target trials are 
programmed, meaning that participants are more likely to make errors on non-target 
trials. It is these non-target errors that can be examined to provide clues about 
participants’ context processing capabilities.  
Some errors will be made because the initial context stimulus has been 
processed well and its representation remains strongly active. Different errors will 
occur because the context representation is poor in the first place or not well 
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maintained in an active state. Consider the three possible types of non-target trial, 
AY, BX and BY, where A and X are the target context and stimulus respectively but 
B and Y are any randomly selected non-target context and stimulus. Good context 
processing would produce more errors on AY than BX trials. This is because if the 
representation of the context stimulus is strongly active, the A of the AY trial will 
produce such a powerful expectation of X that an error is likely when Y is actually 
presented. However the B of the BX trial would still be active on presentation of X so 
the participant would be ready with the non-target response and few errors would 
occur. Conversely, a poorly processed context would result in the opposite pattern, of 
more BX than AY errors. The B of BX trials would not be strongly active on the 
presentation of X, so uncertainty and errors would result due to X’s resemblance to 
the target. This would not be the case on AY trials where only the context stimulus 
resembles the target and it would not be active when the second unambiguous 
stimulus was presented. BY trials should not produce errors due to context processes 
and serve as a general difficulty control.  
Therefore, good context ‘processors’ should always produce more AY than 
BX (≤ AX = BY) errors. However, error patterns resulting from poor context 
processing will be linked to the specific type of impairment. The problem could be 
due to the quality of the initial context representation or an inability to maintain it 
over time. Impoverished representations would produce more BX than AY (≤ AX = 
BY) errors with both short and long durations between stimuli. This pattern would 
emerge only with long durations between stimuli if the problem was to do with 
context maintenance only. It is clear though that the BX versus AY comparison is 
critical in order to distinguish generally poor performance from a specific context 
processing impairment (MacDonald & Carter, 2003). 
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Studies using the AX-CPT procedure have been inconclusive concerning 
depression and context processing. Cohen et al. (1999) reported that depressed 
patients and healthy controls made more BX than AY errors, especially with long 
intervals between stimuli. This error pattern was similar, albeit less extreme, to the 
pattern of errors made by patients with schizophrenia (although see Holmes et al., 
2005; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996). Interestingly, several other studies described 
similar, though perhaps non-significant, trends in healthy controls (e.g., Ceccherini-
Nelli, Turpin-Crowther, & Crow, 2007; Javitt, Rabinowicz, Silipo, & Dias, 2007; 
MacDonald, Pogue-Geile, Johnson, & Carter, 2003). Several possible explanations 
exist for these findings. It might be the case that most people, whether healthy or 
depressed, have difficulties maintaining context stimuli over longer intervals, hence 
the similarity between these groups. Alternatively, in light of the evidence we laid out 
earlier, perhaps higher depression levels in healthy controls were responsible for their 
apparent difficulties. However, as depression levels and the results of BX versus AY 
significance tests have rarely been reported, it is hard to establish whether depression 
is linked to a context processing impairment as measured by the AX-CPT. 
Present Study 
It is presently unclear whether both healthy and depressed people have trouble 
maintaining context information over a longer period or whether elevated levels of 
depression in healthy controls could be responsible for their specific pattern of errors. 
In order to investigate some of these possibilities, we tested a sample of students who 
resembled a healthy control group but who had also been screened for depression. 
They were categorised as non-depressed or mildly depressed by their scores on the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 
and completed either a short or long ISI version of the AX-CPT. If context processing 
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difficulties arise simply from being required to maintain context information actively 
for longer periods, then all participants, irrespective of mood, should make more BX 
than AY errors in long but not short ISI conditions. On the other hand, if the 
similarity between depressed patients and controls is due to depression levels in the 
latter group, then only the depressed group should make this specific pattern of errors. 
Finally, when testing analogue samples of depressed participants, it is 
recommended that anxiety measures should be taken as higher levels of anxiety can 
produce elevated BDI scores (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993) and be responsible 
for any between group differences as opposed to depression specifically. As high 
levels of stress can also produce such an effect, the Depression, Anxiety and Stress 
scales (DASS: Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) were used for this purpose. Finally, 
depressed people often experience interfering ruminative thoughts that impact on the 
ability to concentrate and maintain context information actively for longer periods of 
time.  Therefore a measure of ruminative tendencies was taken using the Ruminative 
Response Scale (RRS: Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited using a mass screening method. They were 
required to fill in the Beck Depression Inventory before being invited to participate 
and then, again, on arrival to take part in the experiment. Only those who scored high 
or low at both time points were included in the sample. Forty participants were 
assigned to the depressed (n = 20, female: n = 10, male: n = 10) or non-depressed (n = 
20, female: n = 10, male: n = 10) groups, where scores of 9 or above indicated mildly 
depressed mood and scores of 8 or below indicated no depression.  There was no 
difference between average BDI scores in the total population of volunteers (M = 
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9.773, SE = .575) and the final selected sample (M = 9.725, SE = 1.238), t(39) = -
.039, p = .969. Half of the participants in each mood group were then assigned to the 
short ISI condition (1-s) and half to the long ISI condition (10-s) with the constraint 
that there should be equal numbers of males and females in each group. One non-
depressed male participant’s data was excluded from all analyses due to an overall 
random error rate (probability of error on all trials > .5). All groups were successfully 
matched on a range of relevant demographic variables, including age, years of 
education, digit span and National Adult Reading Test (NART) scores which provide 
a measure of pre-morbid IQ (see Table 1). As expected, scores on the BDI, DASS 
anxiety, depression and stress scales, and Ruminative Response Scale were higher in 
the depressed than in the non-depressed groups but did not differ across ISI groups. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Materials. A version of the AX-CPT was used and programmed using REALBasic 
Version 3 software. 
Design. A mixed fully factorial design was employed with mood (non-depressed, 
depressed) and ISI (short, long) as between subjects factors. Error type (AX, AY, BX, 
BY) was a repeated measures factor. The dependent variable was whether participants 
made an error (error present) or not (error absent) on each trial. 
 Data analysis. The error present / absent data constitute a binary response 
variable and were entered into a logistic regression model with the frequency of errors 
as a weighting factor. As there was more than one observation for each participant, 
the variable ‘participant’ was included in the analysis in order to control for the effect 
of this factor. This analytical method is recommended for situations with a binary 
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response variable (e.g., absent, present) and where observations occur for several 
strata (e.g., several combinations of control variables, see Agresti & Hartzel, 2000).  
Procedure. Participants gave background information about age, number of years in 
full time education and completed the digit span test, the NART and the BDI. 
Participants were then informed that they would see letters appear sequentially on the 
computer screen and that they were required to press the target button – the return key 
on the computer keyboard – whenever they saw the letter “X” preceded by the letter 
“A”, or press the non-target button – the tab key on the computer keyboard - on trials 
when any other letter sequence was observed. Participants were further instructed that 
on each trial they would have 1-s to make their response and that they should make 
the response as quickly and accurately as possible. If the response occurred after the 
1-s interval had elapsed, a beep would sound indicating a ‘miss’, and they should try 
again on the next trial (see Appendix 1 for the exact text of the instructions shown 
over two screens). The letter pairs were presented on a computer display sequentially 
over 150 trials separated by a 1-s ITI. The delay between each pair of letters (ISI) was 
1-s in the short condition and 10-s in the long condition. Each stimulus remained on 
the screen for 300-ms and after the presentation of the second stimulus in the pair, 
participants had 1-s to make their response. If participants did not respond during the 
allowed interval or gave an incorrect response, this was scored as an error trial. 
Seventy per cent  of trials (105) were AX trials and the remaining 30% were equally 
divided between AY, BX and BY trial types (15 each). Trials were arranged in a 
pseudo-random order such that there would be an equal number of each trial type in 
each 50 trial block. After this, participants completed the Ruminative Response Scale 
and the DASS and were debriefed. 
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Results 
The probability of error predicted by the logistic regression model for each 
error type in both short and long ISI conditions is shown in Figure 1. Participants 
appeared to make more errors in long ISI conditions than short ISI conditions 
although this appeared to depend on mood and error type. 
 
 (Figure 1 about here) 
 
Experimental variables were entered simultaneously into a binary logistic 
regression model resulting in a significant model, χ2 (50) = 244.58, p < .001, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .11.  The effect of error type was significant, χ2 (1) = 18.71, p < .001, 
and the effect of ISI also approached the level of significance, χ2 (1) = 3.75, p = .053. 
The interactions between error type and ISI, χ2 (3) = 10.69, p = .014, and error type, 
ISI and mood, χ2 (3) = 11.94, p = .008, were also significant. None of the other effects 
or interactions, except participant, χ2 (35) = 170.39, p < .001, were reliable predictors.  
The significant three-way interaction between error type, ISI and mood, was 
explored further by testing the ISI by error type interactions for each mood group and 
both were found to be significant (Depressed: χ2 (3) = 9.30, p = .026; Non-depressed: 
χ2 (3) = 8.39, p = .039). Theoretically motivated planned Helmert’s contrasts were 
then carried out on the raw data and tested whether one specified error type in each 
condition was significantly more likely than all the other error types combined in that 
group. As predicted, in long ISI conditions, depressed people made more BX errors 
than any other error type, χ2 (1) = 12.40, p < .001, while the non-depressed made 
more AY errors than any other error type, χ2 (1) = 6.49, p = .011. Although an alpha 
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level of .05 was used for these planned contrasts, significant effects would have also 
met a more conservative rejection criterion. This pattern of errors, which is consistent 
with poor context maintenance in the depressed group and efficient context 
maintenance in the non-depressed, was not observed in short ISI conditions. The 
depressed group made more errors in the BY general difficulty control condition, χ2 
(1) = 7.64, p = .006, whereas the non-depressed made very few errors on AY trials in 
comparison to other trials, χ2 (1) = 5.19, p = .023.  
In order to examine the possibility that the pattern of errors observed in long 
ISI conditions was due to longer procedure times and consequential fatigue rather 
than context maintenance specifically, data from the theoretically important AY and 
BX trials was subjected to further scrutiny. The probability of error on each block of 
50 trials is shown in Table 2.  
 
 (Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 provides no evidence for an increase in errors due to increased 
procedure time. Moreover, the analysis showed that the interaction between ISI, error 
type, mood and trial block was not significant, χ2 (2) = .03, p = .866. 
A further possibility was that levels of anxiety, stress or rumination could 
account for differences in AX-CPT error patterns between the mood groups. In order 
to explore this possibility, correlations were computed between the predicted 
probabilities of errors made in each condition (i.e., depressed, long ISI, BX error) and 
anxiety, stress and rumination scores individually. None of these correlations were 
reliable (anxiety: all p’s > .331; stress: all p’s > .279; rumination: all p’s > .180) and 
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this remained the case if short and long ISI groups or depressed and non-depressed 
groups were combined to increase power.  
 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between 
context processing capabilities and depressed mood using the AX-CPT. We found 
that although non-depressed participants were able to maintain context representations 
strongly over time, errors made by the depressed group were consistent with impaired 
context maintenance. On the other hand, errors made by both mood groups in short 
ISI conditions were neither consistent with good or with inadequate context 
representation. We will discuss all these findings in light of previous studies 
examining context processing and the implications for other cognitive impairments in 
depression.  
Although data from long ISI conditions clearly fits the profiles of good or 
poor context maintenance as predicted by Cohen and colleagues’ theory, data from 
short ISI conditions does not fit predictions. The non-depressed made fewer AY 
errors than any other error type, which were all at a similarly low level. As short AY 
trials are likely to produce more errors with strong context representation, this 
improved performance seems inconsistent. However, Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine 
and Barch’s (2005) explanation for a similar facilitation of AY performance in their 
older adult sample might provide a useful insight. They invoked the notion of 
proactive cognitive control, defined as the ability to sustain context information in 
order to prepare attentional mechanisms for the appearance of the target. The 
suggestion was that impaired proactive control would result in an improvement in AY 
performance because A was less likely to be used as a predictive context for X. One 
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suggestion is that our non-depressed sample tended not to use A in this way in short 
ISI conditions, simply because they found the task so easy. In other words, the 
facilitation of AY performance we observed was due to the lack of need to use 
proactive cognitive control in this task, as opposed to inability. This may be because 
we used a version of the AX-CPT that was possibly shorter than that used in most 
other studies, as short and long ISI trials were not intermixed. The fact that depressed 
groups’ errors peaked in the general difficulty BY condition supports the view that 
errors made in short conditions were reflective of task difficulty or vice versa rather 
than the context processing aspect of the task. 
Previous studies using the AX-CPT yielded no evidence of differences 
between depressed patients and healthy controls. However, error patterns observed in 
AX-CPT data were sometimes suggestive of context maintenance difficulties in both 
depressed groups and healthy controls (e.g., Ceccherini-Nelli et al., 2007; Cohen et 
al., 1999), though this has rarely been the focus of any meaningful discussion. Our 
findings provide some clarification to this confusion. Our sample, which resembled a 
healthy control group, was categorised on the basis of depressed mood and a very 
distinct pattern of errors emerged from the depressed groups. The error pattern in long 
ISI conditions is consistent with context maintenance difficulties in mild depression. 
This further suggests that unassessed levels of depression in healthy control groups 
could be responsible for the similarity between their data and that of depressed 
patients, potentially concealing the effect of any impairment in that group. This 
emphasises the importance of measuring and controlling for relevant confounding 
variables, especially depression in healthy control groups, when the patient control 
group also have diagnoses of depression. 
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In this study data was also collected on levels of stress, anxiety and the 
tendency to ruminate. Levels of stress and anxiety, as opposed to depression 
specifically, could produce erroneous between group differences when analogue 
samples are used (e.g., Vredenburg et al., 1993). We also reasoned that the tendency 
to ruminate during experimental procedures could cause depressed people to perform 
poorly on tasks such as the AX-CPT. However, anxiety, stress and rumination 
measures were not related to errors and the specific error pattern observed in the long 
ISI condition was consistent with an impairment of context maintenance, rather than 
overall difficulties in maintaining attention to the procedure. 
Studies which have concluded no differences between depressed patients and 
healthy controls have been seen as support for the view that impaired context 
processing is a hallmark of schizophrenia specifically (e.g., Cohen et al., 1999; 
Holmes et al., 2005). Our findings cast doubt upon this view because they suggest that 
if depression levels had been measured and controlled in such experiments, 
differences between the groups may have been revealed. As depression levels were 
not measured in healthy control groups, a depression - linked context impairment 
could not be discounted. Thus, our findings add to the growing body of evidence on 
the effects of depressive states on context processing.  
The general conclusion, then, is that people who are depressed have 
difficulties maintaining context information over time. Given the methodology in the 
present study, we cannot conclude a causal role for depression in the genesis of such 
difficulties. In fact, on the basis of the present findings, it is equally possible that 
context processing difficulties could predate depression and contribute to its onset and 
maintenance. For example, people with depression make context independent 
contingency judgements (e.g., Msetfi et al., 2005), report contextually impoverished 
CONTEXT PROCESSING 15 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Williams & Scott, 1988) and display an emotional 
or expressive insensitivity to changes in contextual information (e.g., Rottenberg, 
Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). These findings are consistent with depression both as a cause 
and a consequence of context processing difficulties. On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that disrupted context regulation of affect in depression might stem from 
functional hippocampal impairment related to the effect of stressful early experiences 
(for a discussion see Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000). Thus contextual processing 
difficulties may well precede the onset of depression. 
If one accepted the concept of context processing being causally related to the 
onset and maintenance of depression then it would be possible to incorporate this 
finding into current dominant theoretical accounts of the genesis of depression. For 
example, depressive schema contain generalised, negative self knowledge (I am an 
angry person) and are postulated to have a causal role in the onset of depression (e.g., 
Beck, 1967). Although the process through which specific episodic knowledge (I was 
angry during a particular event) becomes decontextualised and generalised is unclear 
(e.g., Squire, 1992), it is possible that, if contextual processing becomes impaired 
early on, such generalisations would become difficult to modify and could contribute 
to the initial development, as well as the maintenance of pervasive, inflexible 
depressive schema. 
It could also be argued, then, that this area of research sheds light on the 
'active ingredients' of therapeutic approaches to depression that emphasise the 
importance of contextual awareness. One example is mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 1994) 
which emphasises, among other activities, participants gaining an increasing 
awareness of the present moment. This would include the capturing of contextual 
information which might otherwise be lost and which might be important in allowing 
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a richer stream of information to be accessible and processed. This richer stream of 
information then allows for more rounded judgements of the self, the world and 
others to develop and allows the availability of counter examples to be readily 
available. We argue then that the findings of this paper are not only theoretically and 
conceptually coherent but can also provide an explanation for the effectiveness of 
emerging approaches to the successful treatment of depression. 
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Table 1: Demographic and depression relevant characteristic of each experimental 
group. Abbreviations: NART = National Adult Reading Test; BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory; DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales; RRS = Ruminative 
Response Scale. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Non-depressed Depressed 
Measure 
Short Long Short Long 
F p 
<1a ns 
Age 
23.80  
(2.52) 
26.25  
(2.82) 
26.20  
(2.52) 
21.10  
(2.52) 2.11b 0.160 
<1a ns 
Years of education 
15.40  
(0.85) 
15.63  
(0.95) 
16.80  
(0.85) 
15.20  
(0.85) 1.08b 0.310 
<1a ns 
Digit span 
6.60  
(0.34) 
7.00  
(0.38) 
7.00  
(0.34) 
6.70  
(0.34) 1.02b 0.320 
<1a ns 
NART 
30.20  
(2.50) 
32.00  
(2.79) 
33.30  
(2.50) 
32.60  
(2.50) <1b ns 
83.02a <.001 
BDI 
3.00  
(1.38) 
3.75  
(1.54) 
17.00  
(1.38) 
15.60  
(1.38) <1b ns 
10.18a 0.003 
Anxiety - DASS 
2.30  
(1.90) 
3.00  
(2.13) 
9.80  
(1.90) 
8.00  
(1.90) <1b ns 
7.37a 0.010 
Depression - DASS 
1.80  
(2.23) 
6.13  
(2.50) 
11.90  
(2.23) 
8.50 
(2.23) 2.83b 0.100 
7.19a 0.011 
Stress - DASS 
6.40  
(2.04) 
8.75  
(2.28) 
13.20  
(2.04) 
13.20  
(2.04) <1b ns 
2.44a 0.128 
RRS 
44.30  
(4.72) 
49.00  
(5.28) 
53.30  
(4.72) 
55.20  
(4.72) <1b ns 
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Table note: Differences between groups on measures were analysed using a 
Multivariate ANOVA with df of 1, 34. aMain effect of mood. bInteraction between 
Mood and ISI. F and p-values for main effect of ISI were not included as all Fs<1. 
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Table 2: Predicted probability of error on AY and BX trials in each experimental 
group and block of 50 trials. Standard errors of the mean are shown in parentheses.  
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Figure caption. 
 
Figure 1: Mean predicted probability of error as a function of mood, length of inter-
stimulus interval and error-type.
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Appendix 1 
 
Screen 1: 
In this task, you will see lots of different letters appear one at a time on the screen. 
Each letter will only stay on the screen for a brief period of time, before the screen 
goes blank. After a short period of time, the next letter will appear and so on. You 
will also see two buttons appear on the screen - the "Target" button on the right, and 
the "No Target" button on the left. We want you to press the "Target" button when 
you see the letter "X" appear on the screen - BUT ONLY IF the letter "A" appeared 
immediately before it. 
So if you see this sequence of letters 
--- A ---- X -- 
Press the "Target" button as quickly as possible. You can press the "Target" button 
using the return key.  
On the other hand if you see "X" with any other letters of the alphabet immediately 
before it, we want you to press the "No Target" button. You can press the "No Target" 
button, using the TAB key on the key board. 
So for example, if your saw this sequence of letters  
---  B --- X--- or  --- X ---- B --- or --- A --- B --- 
you would press the "No Target" button. 
Screen 2: 
In order that you know when is the appropriate time to make your response, the 
following message will appear on the screen for one second. 
"GIVE YOUR ANSWER QUICKLY" 
This shows that it is the end of one trial and you can make your response while the 
message is on the screen. Therefore you will have only ONE SECOND to press 
EITHER the target or no target button. DO NOT press both and only press once. If 
you press the button after the one second interval - when the 'give your answer' 
message is not on the screen - the computer will make a 'beep' sound to show that you 
have missed. 
We would like you to try to make your response as quickly and accurately as possible. 
However, if you do miss a response, don't worry, try again on the next trial. The 
whole task will last for about 10 minutes. Please ask if you have any questions and 
press the 'carry on' button to continue. 
 
